This paper investigates both aggregate and distributional impacts of the trade integration of China, India, and Central and Eastern Europe in a quantitative multi-country multi-sector model, comparing outcomes with and without factor market frictions. Under perfect withincountry factor mobility, the gains to the rest of the world from trade integration of emerging giants are 0.37%, ranging from −0.37% for Honduras to 2.28% for Sri Lanka. Reallocation of factors across sectors contributes relatively little to the aggregate gains, but has large distributional effects. The aggregate gains to the rest of the world are only 0.065 percentage points lower when neither capital nor labor can move across sectors within a country. On the other hand, the distributional effects of the emerging giants' trade integration are an order of magnitude larger, with changes in real factor returns ranging from −5% to 5% across sectors in most countries. The workers and capital owners in emerging giants' comparative advantage sectors such as Textiles and Wearing Apparel experience greatest losses, while factor owners in Printing and Medical, Precision and Optical Instruments normally gain the most.
Introduction
The biggest event in world trade since 1990 is the rapid integration of emerging giants: China, India, and Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). Their export growth since 1990 has been nothing short of spectacular: 12-fold in China, 8-fold in CEECs, and 6-fold in India.
Together, these countries now account for 20% of world trade, up from 6% in 1990 (Figure 1 ).
The rise of emerging giants raises two important questions. First, what is the aggregate welfare impact of emerging giants' trade integration on economies around the world, and what are the distributional impacts across sectors within a country? And second, how do factor market frictions affect these outcomes?
While the increased global trade integration should benefit the world as a whole, the gains to individual countries and sectors are likely to vary. When it comes to the aggregate gains, some countries -those with comparative advantages similar to the emerging giants -may lose from the giants' integration into global trade. For instance, there is some evidence that the growing importance of China has reduced export demand for a number of emerging market countries (Hanson and Robertson 2010) , and it has been conjectured that the rise of China has been partly responsible for slower than expected economic growth in Mexico (Hanson 2010) .
At the same time, trade integration of emerging giants will create both winners and losers within a country even if the aggregate gains are positive. There is a great deal of evidence that factor market reallocations in response to trade liberalization are far from frictionless (Artuç 2009 , Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren 2010 , Dix-Carneiro 2011 . OECD (2005) provides evidence that developed country workers displaced by import competition experienced longer unemployment spells and larger income losses compared to workers losing jobs for other reasons. Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2012a) and Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Song (2012b) find a large differential impact of Chinese imports to the U.S. across local labor markets and individual workers. Relatedly, International Monetary Fund (2005) shows that the rise of emerging market exports contributed to the fall in the labor share of GDP in the OECD countries.
Not surprisingly, these developments led to a great deal of discussion about the optimal policies to address trade-induced labor market adjustments (OECD 2005 (OECD , 2012 , as well as concrete policy responses. In the U.S., the Trade Adjustment Assistance program was expanded significantly in 2009 (GAO 2012 . At the same time, there were legislative proposals to raise tariffs on Chinese imports in retaliation for China's alleged currency manipulation (New York Times 2011). This paper develops the first comprehensive global-scale quantitative welfare assessment of both aggregate and distributional effects of the emerging giants' trade integration. A modelbased assessment is crucial for the following reasons. First and foremost, evaluating the impact of emerging giants on other countries requires finding the counterfactual equilibrium that would obtain in the absence of trade with the emerging giants. If a country cannot trade with the emerging giants, its trade with all of its other trading partners will change, which would in turn change the trade of its trading partners with other partners, and so on. The impact of emerging giants on each country depends fully on the magnitude and nature of that adjustment. A fully specified model allows us to calculate the counterfactual production allocations and trade flows, and the resulting counterfactual welfare. A regression estimation-based exercise cannot adequately capture the notion of a general equilibrium counterfactual and the associated complex changes in production and trade flows. Second, a fully-specified model enables us to make statements about welfare. Computing welfare changes requires accounting for changes not just in (relative) factor prices, but goods prices as well, since gains from trade will be reaped partly through reductions in the latter. While our approach takes those fully into account, doing so is generally inaccessible to empirical work, in which relative factor prices or relative incomes are normally the objects of analysis. And third, we adopt an explicitly global perspective and analyze the impact of emerging giants on a wide variety of countries. In contrast to one-country studies such as Autor et al. (2012a) , this allows us to detect and quantify some general patterns in the worldwide results.
Our analysis extends the large-scale quantitative model of the world economy recently developed by Zhang (2011, 2012) . We build a multi-sector Ricardian-Heckscher-Ohlin model that incorporates a number of realistic features, such as multiple factors of production, an explicit non-traded sector, the full specification of input-output linkages between the sectors, and both inter-and intra-industry trade. The model is estimated using data on production and trade to yield sector-level productivities for 19 manufacturing sectors and a sample of 75 countries that includes China, India, all major CEECs, as well as virtually all of the other important economies in the world. Having estimated and solved for the long-run equilibrium of the model, we simulate the trade opening of the emerging giants under two extreme sets of assumptions: perfect withincountry factor mobility and no factor mobility across sectors. This exercise allows us to isolate the impact of factor market frictions. In addition, we focus separately on frictions in the labor and capital markets, to identify which ones are more important for reaping the full gains from trade.
The main results can be summarized as follows. First, the gains to the rest of the world from integration of emerging giants under perfect factor mobility are 0.37%, ranging from −0.37% for Honduras to 2.28% for Sri Lanka. Second, reallocation of factors across sectors contributes relatively little to these gains: the welfare gains to the rest of the world are only about 0.065 percentage points lower in the fixed-factors version of the model in which neither capital nor labor can move across sectors within a country. Thus the aggregate gains from trade with emerging giants come largely from intra-industry trade.
Third, there are strong complementarities between reallocation of labor and capital across sectors. Versions of the model with immobile labor but mobile capital, or with immobile capital but mobile labor produce welfare changes that are quite close to the outcome when both factors are immobile. This suggests that to reap the full benefits of sectoral reallocation due to globalization, it is essential that both labor and capital markets function smoothly. Just one inflexible factor market, be it rigid labor markets (as in continental Europe), or poor capital markets (as in much of the developing world) will, quantitatively, negate the benefits of reallocation in the other factor markets.
Fourth, with imperfect factor mobility the distributional consequences of the emerging giants' integration are an order of magnitude greater than the aggregate consequences. While the aggregate gains to the rest of the world tend to amount to a fraction of a percent, in a typical country changes in real wages and returns to capital range from −5% to 5% across sectors. As a group, emerging giants' comparative advantage is in light manufacturing industries such as Textiles and Wearing Apparel, and their comparative disadvantage is in high-tech manufacturing industries such as Printing and Medical, Precision and Optical Instruments. Not surprisingly, in the rest of the world the workers and capital owners in light manufacturing experience greatest losses, while factor owners in high-tech sectors normally gain the most. Controlling for country and sector fixed effects, sectors with higher productivity tend to benefit the most/lose the least from trade opening.
Methodologically, our work builds on recent quantitative welfare assessments of trade integration in multi-sector Ricardian models (Shikher 2011 , Caliendo and Parro 2010 , Costinot, Donaldson and Komunjer 2012 . A number of studies analyze the long-run aggregate impact of some of the emerging giant countries on welfare around the world (Coleman 2007 , Hsieh and Ossa 2011 , di Giovanni, Levchenko and Zhang 2012 , Levchenko and Zhang 2012 . This paper is the first to quantitatively explore the consequences of factor market frictions in this type of framework.
Our work is also related to the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) assessments of trade integration of the major emerging markets: see, e.g., Francois and Wignaraja (2008) , Ghosh and Rao (2010) and Tokarick (2011) for China, and Baldwin, Francois and Portes (1997), Brown, Deardorff, Djankov and Stern (1997) , Hertel, Brockmeier and Swaminathan (1997) , and Baourakis, Lakatos and Xepapadeas (2008) for Eastern Europe. Unlike the traditional CGE approach, our quantitative framework is based on Eaton and Kortum (2002) 's Ricardian model of trade with endogenous specialization both within and across sectors, which enables us to relate our findings to comparative advantage. In addition, because the trade integration of these emerging giant countries has been concurrent, we consider their joint global welfare impact. Our global general equilibrium approach complements recent micro-level studies of the impact of trade with emerging markets on developed countries, such as Autor et al. (2012a ), Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen (2011 ), and Hummels, Jorgensen, Munch and Xiang (2011 .
Before moving on to the description of the model and the results, we outline some limitations of our analysis. Our model features fixed labor supply, and thus cannot be used to explore the role of emerging giants in the phenomenon of workers permanently leaving the labor force and the resulting reduction in aggregate employment. We conjecture that allowing for the possibility of workers leaving the labor force would reduce the labor supply in the import-competing industries, which would mitigate the adverse wage impact on the active workers. On the other hand the welfare impact on those leaving the labor force would then depend on their utility from not working. Our current framework also cannot be used to evaluate the role emerging giants may have played in the permanent de-industrialization process observed in a number of advanced economies. To capture this effect, the model would need to be augmented to incorporate tradeable services. Unfortunately, the data required for estimating the model with tradeable services are not currently available.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the quantitative framework and discusses the details of calibration and estimation. Section 3 discusses the main results, and Section 4 concludes.
Quantitative Framework

The Environment
The world is comprised of N countries, indexed by n and i. There are J tradeable sectors, plus one nontradeable sector J + 1. Utility over these sectors in country n is given by
where ξ n denotes the Cobb-Douglas weight for the tradeable sector composite good, η is the elasticity of substitution between the tradeable sectors, ω j is the taste parameter for tradeable sector j, Y J+1 n is the nontradeable-sector composite good, and Y j n is the composite good in tradeable sector j.
Each sector j aggregates a continuum of varieties q ∈ [0, 1] unique to each sector using a CES production function:
where ε denotes the elasticity of substitution across varieties q, Q j n is the total output of sector j in country n, and Q j n (q) is the amount of variety q that is used in production in sector j and country n. Producing one unit of good q in sector j in country n requires
Production uses labor (L), capital (K), and intermediate inputs from other sectors. The cost of an input bundle is:
where w j n is the wage of workers in sector j, r j n is the return to capital installed in sector j, and p k n is the price of intermediate input from sector k. The value-added based labor intensity is given by α j , and the share of value added in total output by β j . Both vary by sector. The shares of inputs from other sectors, γ k,j vary by output industry j as well as input industry k.
Following Eaton and Kortum (2002, henceforth EK) , productivity z j n (q) for each q ∈ [0, 1] in each sector j is random, and drawn from the Fréchet distribution with cdf:
In this distribution, the absolute advantage term T j n varies by both country and sector, with higher values of T j n implying higher average productivity draws in sector j in country n. The parameter θ captures dispersion, with larger values of θ implying smaller dispersion in draws.
The production cost of one unit of good q in sector j and country n is thus equal to c j n /z j n (q). Each country can produce each good in each sector, and international trade is subject to iceberg costs: d j ni > 1 units of good q produced in sector j in country i must be shipped to country n in order for one unit to be available for consumption there. The trade costs need not be symmetric
in -and will vary by sector. We normalize d j nn = 1 for any n and j. All the product and factor markets are perfectly competitive, and thus the price at which country i supplies tradeable good q in sector j to country n is:
Buyers of each good q in tradeable sector j in country n will only buy from the cheapest source country, and thus the price actually paid for this good in country n will be:
Characterization of Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium of this model world economy consists of a set of prices, allocation rules, and trade shares such that (i) given the prices, all firms' inputs satisfy the first-order con-ditions, and their output is given by the production function; (ii) given the prices, the consumers' demand satisfies the first-order conditions; (iii) the prices ensure the market clearing conditions for labor, capital, tradeable goods and nontradeable goods; (iv) trade shares ensure balanced trade for each country.
The set of prices includes the wage rates {w We distinguish between 4 types of equilibria, that differ in the assumptions on factor market frictions: (i) flexible factors equilibrium, in which both capital and labor are free to move across sectors; (ii) fixed factors equilibrium, in which both capital and labor belong to a particular sector and cannot move across sectors; (iii) flexible-labor, fixed-capital equilibrium, in which capital cannot move across sectors but labor can do so frictionlessly, and (iv) flexible-capital, fixed-labor equilibrium, in which labor cannot move across sectors but capital can do so frictionlessly. All throughout, both capital are labor are immobile across countries.
Demand and Prices
The four equilibria have identical goods market clearing conditions. It can be easily shown that the price of sector j's output will be given by:
Following the standard EK approach, it is helpful to define
This value summarizes, for country n, the access to production technologies in sector j. Its value will be higher if in sector j, country n's trading partners have high productivity (T j i ) or low cost (c j i ). It will also be higher if the trade costs that country n faces in this sector are low. Standard steps lead to the familiar result that the price of good j in country n is simply
where Γ = Γ θ+1−ε θ 1 1−ε , with Γ the Gamma function. The consumption price index in country n is then:
where
. The budget constraint (or the resource constraint) of the consumer is thus given by
where K j n and L j n are the amounts of capital and labor, respectively, in country n, sector j. Given the set of prices {w n , r n , P n , {p
, we first characterize the optimal allocations from final demand. Consumers maximize utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (4). The first order conditions associated with this optimization problem imply the following final demand:
and
Production Allocation and Goods Market Clearing
Let Q j n denote the total sectoral demand in country n and sector j. Q j n is used for both final consumption and as intermediate inputs in domestic production of all sectors. Denote by X j n = p j n Q j n the total spending on the sector j goods in country n, and by X j ni country n's total spending on sector j goods coming from country i, i.e. n's imports of j from country i. The EK structure in each sector j delivers the standard result that the probability of importing good q from country i, π j ni is equal to the share of total spending on goods coming from country i, X j ni /X j n , and is given by:
The market clearing condition for expenditure on sector j in country n is:
Total expenditure in sector j of country n, p j n Q j n , is the sum of (i) domestic final consumption expenditure p j n Y j n ; (ii) expenditure on sector j goods as intermediate inputs in all the traded sectors
, and (iii) expenditure on the j's sector intermediate inputs in the domestic non-traded sector (1 − β J+1 )γ j,J+1 p J+1 n Q J+1 n . These market clearing conditions summarize two important features of the world economy captured by our model: complex international production linkages, as much of world trade is in intermediate inputs, and a good crosses borders multiple times before being consumed (Hummels, Ishii and Yi 2001) ; and two-way input linkages between the tradeable and the nontradeable sectors.
In each tradeable sector j, some goods q are imported from abroad and some goods q are exported to the rest of the world. Country n's exports in sector j are given by EX
, and its imports in sector j are given by IM
, where 1I i =n is the indicator function. The total exports of country n are then EX n = J j=1 EX j n , and total imports are
Trade balance requires that for any country n, EX n − IM n = 0.
Factor Market Clearing in the Four Equilibria
Given the total production revenue in tradeable sector j in country n,
, the sectoral factor allocations and factor prices must satisfy
For the nontradeable sector J + 1, the optimal factor allocations in country n are simply given by
Finally, the feasibility conditions for factors are given by, for any n,
where L n and K n are aggregate country endowments of labor and capital.
In the flexible factors equilibrium, both factors can move, so that wages and returns to capital must be equalized across sectors in each country: w j n = w n and r j n = r n . Correspondingly, sectoral factor allocations L j n and K j n are equilibrium outcomes that will adjust to satisfy equality of factor returns in all sectors. Equilibrium w n , r n , and {K j n , L j n } J+1 j=1 are the solutions to the systems of equations (7)- (8) (9) becomes vacuous, and the systems of equations (7)- (8) The model has two principal uses. The first is to estimate the sector-level technology parameters T j n for a large set of countries. The technology parameters in the tradeable sectors relative to a reference country (the U.S.) are estimated using data on sectoral output and bilateral trade.
The procedure relies on fitting a structural gravity equation implied by the model. Intuitively, if controlling for the typical gravity determinants of trade, a country spends relatively more on domestically produced goods in a particular sector, it is revealed to have either a high relative productivity or a low relative unit cost in that sector. The procedure then uses data on factor and intermediate input prices to net out the role of factor costs, yielding an estimate of relative productivity. This step also produces estimates of bilateral, sector-level trade costs d j ni . The next step is to estimate the technology parameters in the tradeable sectors for the U.S.. This procedure requires directly measuring TFP at the sectoral level using data on real output and inputs, and then correcting measured TFP for selection due to trade. Third, we calibrate the nontradeable technology for all countries using the first-order condition of the model and the relative prices of nontradeables observed in the data. The detailed procedures for all three steps are described in Levchenko and Zhang (2011) and reproduced in Appendix A.
The second use of the quantitative model is to perform welfare analysis. Given the estimated sectoral productivities, factor endowments, trade costs, and model parameters, we solve the system of equations defining the equilibrium under the baseline values, as well as under counterfactual scenarios, and compare welfare. The algorithm for solving the model is described in Levchenko and Zhang (2011).
Welfare
Welfare in this framework corresponds to the indirect utility function. The functional form of the utility function and homothetic preferences imply that welfare of any agent in the economy equals his/her total income divided by the price level. Since both goods and factor markets are competitive, total income equals the total returns to factors of production. Total welfare in the economy is given by
where the consumption price level P n comes from equation (3). This expression is the metric of aggregate welfare in all counterfactual exercises below. Or course, in the flexible market equilibrium, when all factor returns are the same, the expression above simplifies to, in per capita terms, the more familiar expression (w n + r n k n )/P n , where k n = K n /L n is capital per worker.
When (some) factor markets are not flexible, workers and units of capital employed in the different sectors will earn different wages and returns. Without making assumptions about individuals' capital asset holdings, we cannot make statements about individuals' welfare. Thus, when discussing distributional impacts in our counterfactual exercises, we will present results with respect to the real wage and the real returns to capital across sectors, w j n /P n and r j n /P n .
Calibration
In order to implement the model numerically, we must calibrate the following sets of parameters:
(i) moments of the productivity distributions T j n and θ; (ii) trade costs d j ni ; (iii) production function parameters α j , β j , γ k,j , and ε; (iv) country factor endowments L n and K n ; and (v) preference parameters ξ n , ω j , and η. We discuss the calibration of each in turn.
Estimation of sectoral productivity parameters T Bilateral trade data were collected from the UN COMTRADE database, and concorded to the same sectoral classification. We assume that the dispersion parameter θ does not vary across sectors. There are no reliable estimates of how it varies across sectors, and thus we do not model this variation. We pick the value of θ = 8.28, which is the preferred estimate of EK. 1 It is important to assess how the results below are affected by the value of this parameter. One may be especially concerned about how the results change under lower values of θ. Lower θ implies greater within-sector heterogeneity in the random productivity draws. Thus, trade flows become less sensitive to the costs of the input bundles (c j i ), and the gains from intra-sectoral trade become larger relative to the gains from inter-sectoral trade. Elsewhere (Levchenko and Zhang 2011) we re-estimated all the technology parameters using instead a value of θ = 4, which 1 Shikher (2004, 2005, 2011) , Burstein and Vogel (2012) , and Eaton, Kortum, Neiman and Romalis (2011), among others, follow the same approach of assuming the same θ across sectors. Caliendo and Parro (2010) use tariff data and triple differencing to estimate sector-level θ. However, their approach may suffer from significant measurement error: at times the values of θ they estimate are negative. In addition, in each sector the restriction that θ > ε − 1 must be satisfied, and it is not clear whether Caliendo and Parro (2010)'s estimated sectoral θ's meet this restriction in every case. Our approach is thus conservative by being agnostic on this variation across sectors.
has been advocated by Simonovska and Waugh (2011) and is at or near the bottom of the range that has been used in the literature. Overall, the outcome was remarkably similar. The correlation between estimated T j i 's under θ = 4 and the baseline is above 0.95, and there is actually somewhat greater variability in T j i 's under θ = 4. The production function parameters α j and β j are estimated using the UNIDO and EURO-STAT production data, which contain information on output, value added, employment, and wage bills. To compute α j for each sector, we calculate the share of the total wage bill in value added, and take a simple median across countries (taking the mean yields essentially the same results).
To compute β j , we take the median of value added divided by total output. in column j. Thus, it is the direct counterpart to the input coefficients γ k,j . Note that we assume these to be the same in all countries. 2 In addition, we use the U.S. I-O matrix to obtain α J+1 and β J+1 in the nontradeable sector, which cannot be obtained from UNIDO. 3 The elasticity of substitution between varieties within each tradeable sector, ε, is set to 4 (as is well known, in the EK model this elasticity plays no role, entering only the constant Γ).
The total labor force in each country, L n , and the total capital stock, K n , are obtained from the Penn World Tables 6.3. Following the standard approach in the literature (see, e.g. Hall and Jones 1999 , Bernanke and Gürkaynak 2001 , Caselli 2005 , the total labor force is calculated from the data on the total GDP per capita and per worker. 4 The total capital is calculated using the perpetual inventory method that assumes a depreciation rate of 6%: K n,t = (1−0.06)K n,t−1 +I n,t , where I n,t is total investment in country n in period t. For most countries, investment data start in 1950, and the initial value of K n is set equal to I n,0 /(γ + 0.06), where γ is the average growth rate of investment in the first 10 years for which data are available.
The share of expenditure on traded goods, ξ n in each country is sourced from Yi and Zhang (2010), who compile this information for 36 developed and developing countries. For countries 2 di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010) provide suggestive evidence that at such a coarse level of aggregation, InputOutput matrices are indeed similar across countries. To check robustness of the results, we collected country-specific I-O matrices from the GTAP database. Productivities computed based on country-specific I-O matrices were very similar to the baseline values. In our sample of countries, the median correlation was 0.98, with all but 3 out of 75 countries having a correlation of 0.93 or above, and the minimum correlation of 0.65.
3 The U.S. I-O matrix provides an alternative way of computing αj and βj. These parameters calculated based on the U.S. I-O then set ξ n to the value predicted by this bivariate regression at their level of income. The taste parameters for tradeable sectors ω j were estimated by combining the model structure above with data on final consumption expenditure shares in the U.S. sourced from the U.S. Input-Output matrix, as described in Appendix A. The elasticity of substitution between broad sectors within the tradeable bundle, η, is set to 2. Since these are very large product categories, it is sensible that this elasticity would be relatively low. It is higher, however, than the elasticity of substitution between tradeable and nontradeable goods, which is set to 1 by the Cobb-Douglas assumption.
Summary of the Estimates and Basic Patterns
All of the variables that vary over time are averaged over the period [2005] [2006] [2007] (the latest available year), which is the time period on which we carry out the analysis. Appendix Table A1 lists the 75 countries used in the analysis, separating them into the major country groups and regions.
Appendix Table A2 lists the 20 sectors along with the key parameter values for each sector: α j , β j , the share of nontradeable inputs in total inputs γ J+1,j , and the taste parameter ω j .
What do the data tell us about the emerging giants' comparative advantage? Figure 2 reports the population-weighted average sectoral productivities of emerging giant countries, expressed as a ratio to the world frontier. To be precise, we compute the world frontier productivity in each sector as the geometric average of the top two productivities in the sample of all countries.
Since average sectoral productivity scales with (T j n ) 1/θ rather than T j n , we report the (populationweighted) ratio of (T 
Welfare Analysis
This section analyzes the global welfare impact of emerging giants' trade integration under the different assumptions on factor market reallocation. We proceed by first solving the model under the baseline values of all the estimated parameters, and present a number of checks on the model fit with respect to observed data. Then, we compute counterfactual welfare and sectoral factor allocations under the assumption that the emerging giants are in autarky. The welfare change due to the opening of emerging giants in the flexible market equilibrium is then given by the comparison of baseline welfare to welfare when emerging giants are in autarky. This approach in effect assumes that by the mid-2000s, factor market adjustment to the trade opening of these countries had already (largely) occurred.
Then, we solve the model under three additional scenarios with inflexible labor markets. In all three, emerging giants are open to trade. In the fixed factors equilibrium, all factors must remain in sectors where they were when the emerging giants were in autarky. In the fixed labor equilibrium, labor cannot move from its allocation when emerging giants were in autarky, while in the fixed capital equilibrium, capital cannot. Comparing welfare and sectoral factor prices in these three scenarios to the model in which emerging giants are in autarky provides estimates of the welfare impact of emerging giants under frictional factor markets, as well as of the distributional effects of their arrival in world trade. The second panel performs the same comparison for the return to capital. Since it is difficult to observe the return to capital in the data, we follow the approach adopted in the estimation of T j n 's and impute r n from an aggregate factor market clearing condition:
Model Fit
where α is the aggregate share of labor in GDP, assumed to be 2/3. Once again, the average levels of r n are very similar in the model and the data, and the correlation between the two is about 0.94.
Next, we compare the trade shares implied by the model to those in the data. The third panel of Table 1 reports the spending on domestically produced goods as a share of overall spending, π We conclude from this exercise that our model matches quite closely the relative incomes of countries as well as bilateral and overall trade flows observed in the data. We now use the model to carry out a number of counterfactual scenarios to assess the emerging giants' global welfare impact.
Gains under Flexible Factor Markets
Panel A of Table 2 reports the gains from trade with the emerging giants around the world under the assumption of flexible factor markets. To compute these, we compare the welfare of each country in the baseline (current levels of trade costs and productivities as we estimate them in the world today) against a counterfactual scenario in which emerging giants are in autarky.
The table reports the change in welfare for emerging giants themselves, as well as the summary statistics for each region and country group. China's gains from trade relative to complete autarky are 3.48%, India's 1.63%, and CEECs' gains range from 2.75% for Russia to 13.26% for Bulgaria, with an average of 7.26%. Elsewhere in the world, the gains range from −0.37% to 2.28%, with the mean of 0.37%. 5 The gains for the rest of the world from emerging giants' trade integration are smaller than for emerging giants themselves because these gains are relative to the counterfactual that preserves all the global trade relationships other than with the emerging giants.
The countries gaining the most tend to be close to the emerging giants geographically. The top three are Sri Lanka (2.28%), Senegal (1.21%), and Malaysia (1.16%). Of the top 10, 6 are in Asia, the other four being Senegal, Ethiopia, Kuwait, and Austria. As a region, East and South Asia gains the most (0.7% average), while Latin America and the Caribbean gain the least (0.16%). Table 2 also reveals that in several major country groups, the welfare changes range from negative to positive. A total of four countries lose in absolute terms from entry of emerging giants into world trade: Honduras (−0.37%), El Salvador (−0.13%), Pakistan (−0.05%), and Portugal (−0.01%).
Sectoral Reallocation and Reaping the Aggregate Gains
The preceding counterfactual assumed that factor markets are fully flexible within countries, and thus the welfare changes computed in that scenario corresponded to the long-run, complete gains from trade integration with the emerging giants. Next, we assess the importance of cross-sectoral reallocation in reaping the full magnitude of those gains. Table 2 reports the welfare gains from trade with emerging giants under the assumption of all factors fixed. It is immediate that all gains are smaller. For China, for instance, the gains from trade are now 3.13%, compared to 3.48% under flexible factors. It is also clear that the impact is quite minor, and the broad patterns in the data as to which regions gain the most and least are the same. Table 3 Is there a factor of production that is especially crucial for reaping the benefits of factor reallocation? To answer this question, we evaluated the gains from trade with the emerging giants under two additional sets of assumptions: fixed-labor and fixed-capital, with the corresponding other factor being mobile. The results are reported in the second and third columns of Table   3 . Several conclusions stand out. As expected, the differences with respect to the flexible-factor case tend to be smaller under these two scenarios: gains tend to be larger when one of the factors can reallocate optimally than when none of the factors can. However, the difference is quite minor quantitatively. For all intents and purposes, the scenarios with one factor fixed produce very similar results to the case in which both factors are fixed. This result points to a strong complementarity between reallocation of labor and capital. Both are required to reap the full gains from reallocation, and just one immobile factor prevents the large majority of total gains from factor reallocation.
Panel B of
We explore further the relationship between the welfare gains under the different factor (im)mobilities in Table 4 and Figure 4 . The table presents the correlations between the welfare changes implied by the four scenarios. It is clear that all four are extremely highly correlated, with correlation coefficients in excess of 0.98 in nearly all cases, and above 0.99 between the three fixed factors equilibria. The figure presents the scatterplot of the welfare changes in the three inflexible equilibria on the y-axis against the welfare change in the flexible case on the x-axis, along with the 45-degree line. By an large, the observations are slightly below the 45-degree line.
The different inflexible equilibria are different from each other, but only very slightly.
Distributional Effects
The key feature of the fixed factors equilibrium is that the changes in real wages and returns to capital brought about by the opening of emerging giants will differ across sectors. This allows us to examine the distributional effects of this episode. Appendix Tables A3 and A4 report the summary statistics for the distribution of sectoral real wage changes (w j n /P j n 's) for the emerging giant and the rest of the world samples, respectively.
The first important conclusion is that the distributional effects are an order of magnitude larger than the average/aggregate effects. We saw above that for emerging giants, aggregate welfare gains were on the order of a few percentage points, ranging from about 1.7% to about 14% in this set of countries. The cross-sectoral standard deviation of real wage changes, by contrast, ranges from 7.24% in Poland to 31.96% for Kazakhstan, with an average of 15.76%. The range of outcomes is very wide, from large losses (more than halving of the real wage) to large gains (such as a doubling of the real wage). For the rest of the world, both the aggregate gains (as we saw above), and the dispersion are smaller, but it is still the case that the distributional consequences are far larger than the aggregate changes.
We now document the patterns found in these sectoral real wage changes. The first question we ask is, are there particular sectors that bore the brunt of the adjustment, and others that on average benefited the most? Table 5 There is a striking (though not surprising) regularity that the sectoral gains and losses are negatively correlated across the two groups. This pronounced global pattern at sector level hides a fair amount of heterogeneity across countries and regions. Figure 6 plots, for each sector, the median real wage change in each region.
For emerging giants, we separate China, India, and the median for the CEECs. For the rest of the world, we report medians for each major region/country group. (The numbers used to build this figure are reported in Table A5 .) The cross-regional heterogeneity is apparent. For instance, the rest of the world loses on average in Wearing Apparel. We see from the figure that the highest losses in that sector were in the OECD and East and South Asia. For Leather and Footwear, the gains across regions actually range from large negative for the OECD to large positive for the Middle East/North Africa and East and South Asia. On average we found that the high-tech manufacturing sectors in the rest of the world tend to benefit. It is clear from the figure that the main beneficiaries are the OECD and East and South Asian countries.
For the emerging giants, we see a great deal of dispersion within each sector as well. In the light manufacturing sectors, the gains to China and India are much larger than to the CEECs, while the losses in Paper and Products and high-tech manufacturing are also larger for China and India. There are sectors, notably Basic Metals, for which the regions diverge dramatically, some exhibiting largest losses, some largest gains.
Finally, we disaggregate further to the country level and exploit the role of sectoral productivity (T j n ) in driving the real wage changes. While import competition should lower real wages on average, it should still be the case that the losses are smaller (or gains are larger) in countries in which a sector is more productive. To assess the importance of this effect, we regress the percent change in the real wage on the full set of country and sector effects, as well as sectoral productivity expressed as a ratio to world frontier, (T j n /T j F ) 1/θ . The partial correlation plots are presented in Figure 7 , broken down into two country groups. In both the rest of the world and the emerging giants, relatively more productive sectors gain more/lose less. The effect is highly statistically significant (we use robust standard errors), and economically large. 6 In the rest of the world one standard deviation change in T relative to the frontier (a change 0.24, for example, a move from 0.2 to 0.44 of the world frontier productivity) leads to a 1 percentage point higher real wage due to the opening of emerging giants. Given that average real wage changes are for the most part less than 1%, this is a large effect. In other words, while import-competing sectors such as Wearing Apparel, Textiles, and Footwear do lose from the opening of emerging giants on average, for individual sectors in individual countries higher productivity can still play a major role in mitigating the losses.
Conclusion
The rapid trade integration of the major emerging markets has been the major development in world trade over the past 20 years. This paper carries out a quantitative assessment of both aggregate and distributional consequences of the emerging giants' trade opening. Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, the aggregate welfare gains from the integration of emerging giants to the rest of the world are 0.37% on average, with a range from modest absolute losses in a small number of countries, to gains of 1−2 percentage points. Second, cross-sectoral reallocation of labor and capital contributes only modestly (0.065 percentage points) to the overall aggregate gains. This is because there is a great deal of room for within-sector reallocation of production to reap the gains from trade with these countries. Third, there are strong complementarities between cross-sectoral mobility of factors. Fixing one of the factors to its initial sectors results in very similar welfare losses to the case in which both factors cannot move. This suggests that policies promoting smooth functioning of labor and capital markets will have the largest effect when implemented together. Fourth, the distributional consequences of this episode of trade opening are an order of magnitude larger than aggregate consequences. While aggregate gains to a typical country are a fraction of a percent, the real wage changes across sectors typically range from −5% to 5%. There are pronounced patterns in the distributional impact of emerging giants.
Light manufacturing industries tend to gain the most in emerging giants, and lose the most in the rest of the world, and the opposite is true for high-tech manufacturing. Controlling for sectoral and country average changes, more productive sectors gain more. 
A.1 Tradeable Sector Relative Technology
We now focus on the tradeable sectors. Following the standard EK approach, first divide trade shares by their domestic counterpart:
, which in logs becomes:
Let the (log) iceberg costs be given by the following expression: , where the subscript us denotes the United States. It is immediate from this expression that estimation delivers a convolution of technology parameters T j n and cost parameters c j n . Both will of course affect trade volumes, but we would like to extract technology T j n from these estimates. In order to do that, we follow the approach of Shikher (2004). In particular, for each country n, the share of total spending going to home-produced goods is given by
Dividing by its U.S. counterpart yields: , and thus the ratio of price levels in sector j relative to the U.S. becomes:
The entire right-hand side of this expression is either observable or estimated. Thus, we can impute the price levels relative to the U.S. in each country and each tradeable sector.
The cost of the input bundles relative to the U.S. can be written as:
Using information on relative wages, returns to capital, price in each tradeable sector from (A.1), and the nontradeable sector price relative to the U.S., we can thus impute the costs of the input bundles relative to the U.S. in each country and each sector. Armed with those values, it is straightforward to back out the relative technology parameters:
A.2 Trade Costs
The bilateral, directional, sector-level trade costs of shipping from country i to country n in sector j are then computed based on the estimated coefficients as:
for an assumed value of θ. Note that the estimate of the trade costs includes the residual from the gravity regression θ ν j ni . Thus, the trade costs computed as above will fit bilateral sectoral trade flows exactly, given the estimated fixed effects. Note also that the exporter component of the trade costs ex j i is part of the exporter fixed effect. Since each country in the sample appears as both an exporter and an importer, the exporter and importer estimated fixed effects are combined to extract an estimate of θ ex 
A.3 Complete Estimation
So far we have estimated the levels of technology of the tradeable sectors relative to the United States. To complete our estimation, we still need to find (i) the levels of T for the tradeable sectors in the United States; (ii) the taste parameters ω j , and (iii) the nontradeable technology levels for all countries.
To obtain (i), we use the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database for the U.S. (Bartelsman and Gray 1996) . We start by measuring the observed TFP levels for the tradeable sectors in the U.S.. The form of the production function gives
where Λ j denotes the measured TFP in sector j, Z j denotes the output, L j denotes the labor input, K j denotes the capital input, and M k,j denotes the intermediate input from sector k. The NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database offers information on output, and inputs of labor, capital, and intermediates, along with deflators for each. Thus, we can estimate the observed TFP level for each manufacturing tradeable sector using the above equation.
If the United States were a closed economy, the observed TFP level for sector j would be given by Λ To estimate the taste parameters {ω j } J j=1 , we use information on final consumption shares in the tradeable sectors in the U.S.. We start with a guess of {ω j } J j=1 and find sectoral prices p k n as follows. For an initial guess of sectoral prices, we compute the tradeable sector aggregate price and the nontradeable sector price using the data on the relative prices of nontradeables to tradeables.
Using these prices, we calculate sectoral unit costs and Φ j n 's, and update prices according to equation (2), iterating until the prices converge. We then update the taste parameters according to equation (5), using the data on final sectoral expenditure shares in the U.S.. We normalize the vector of ω j 's to have a sum of one, and repeat the above procedure until the values for the taste parameters converge.
Finally, we estimate the nontradeable sector TFP using the relative prices. In the model, the nontradeable sector price is given by
Since we know the aggregate price level in the tradeable sector p T n , c J+1 n , and the relative price of nontradeables (which we take from the data), we can back out T J+1 n from the equation above for all countries. Notes: This figure displays the emerging giants' population-weighted productivity ((T j n ) 1/θ ), as a ratio to the world frontier in each sector. The horizontal line is the geometric average emerging giants' productivity across sectors. The key for sector labels is reported in Table A2 . Notes: This table reports the sectors used in the analysis. The classification corresponds to the ISIC Revision 3 2-digit, aggregated further due to data availability. αj is the value-added based labor intensity; βj is the share of value added in total output; γJ+1,j is the share of nontradeable inputs in total intermediate inputs; ωj is the taste parameter for tradeable sector j, estimated using the procedure described in Section A.3. Variable definitions and sources are described in detail in the text. 
